Every time people speak about Colombia, we think about guerrilla, drug, violence, kidnapping and extorsion…Why the word Colombia is synomyn with such iilegal activities. We are trying to understand the major elements which made Colombia famous for its illegal drug and guerrilla war…
1. Some background:
Spanish explorers made the first exploration of the Caribbean littoral in 1499 led by Rodrigo de Bastidas. Christopher Columbus navigated near the Caribbean in 1502. In 1508, Vasco Núñez de Balboa started the conquest of the territory through the region of Urabá. In 1513, he was the first European to discover the Pacific Ocean, which he called Mar del Sur (or "Sea of the South") and which in fact would bring the Spaniards to Peru and Chile.
Alonso de Lugo (who had sailed with Columbus) reached the Guajira Peninsula in 1500. Santa Marta was founded in 1525, and Cartagena in 1533. Gonzalo Jiminez de Quesada led an expedition to the interior in 1535, and founded the "New City of Granada", the name soon changed to "Santa Fé." Two other notable journeys by Spaniards to the interior took place in the same period. Sebastian de Belalcazar, conqueror of Quito, traveled north and founded Cali in 1536 and Popayán in 1537; Nicolas Federman crossed the Llanos Orientales and went over the Eastern Cordillera. The Caribbean people, whom the Spaniards conquered through warfare and alliances, while resulting disease such as smallpox, and the conquest and ethnic cleansing itself caused a demographic reduction among the indigenous people.In the 16th century, Europeans began to bring slaves from Africa.
The Spanish settled along the north coast of today's Colombia as early as the 1500s, but their first permanent settlement, at Santa Marta, was not established until 1525. In 1549, the institution of the Audiencia in Santa Fe de Bogotá gave that city the status of capital of New Granada, which comprised in large part what is now territory of Colombia. Since the beginning of the periods of conquest and colonization, there were several rebel movements under Spanish rule, most of them were either crushed or remained too weak to change the overall situation. The last one which sought outright independence from Spain sprang up around 1810, following the independence of St. Domingue (present-day Haiti) in 1804, which provided a non-negligible degree of support to the eventual leaders of this rebellion: Simón Bolívar and Francisco de Paula Santander.
Colombia was the first constitutional government in South America, and the Liberal and Conservative parties, founded in 1848 and 1849 respectively, are two of the oldest surviving political parties in the Americas.
Internal political and territorial divisions led to the secession of Venezuela and Quito (today's Ecuador) in 1830. The so-called "Department of Cundinamarca" adopted the name "Nueva Granada", which it kept until 1856 when it became the "Confederación Granadina" (Granadine Confederation). After a two-year civil war in 1863, the "United States of Colombia" was created, lasting until 1886, when the country finally became known as the Republic of Colombia. Internal divisions remained between the bipartisan political forces, occasionally igniting very bloody civil wars, the most significant being the Thousand Days' War (1899–1902).
This, together with the United States of America's intentions to influence the area (especially the Panama Canal construction and control) led to the separation of the Department of Panama in 1903 and the establishment of it as a nation. The United States paid Colombia $25,000,000 in 1921, seven years after completion of the canal, for redress of President Roosevelt's role in the creation of Panama, and Colombia recognized Panama under the terms of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty. Colombia was engulfed in the Year-Long War with Peru over a territorial dispute involving the Amazonas Department and its capital Leticia. Soon after, Colombia achieved a relative degree of political stability, which was interrupted by a bloody conflict that took place between the late 1940s and the early 1950s, a period known as La Violencia ("The Violence"). Its cause was mainly mounting tensions between the two leading political parties, which subsequently ignited after the assassination of the Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on 9 April 1948. This ensuing riots in Bogotá, known as El Bogotazo, spread throughout the country and claimed the lives of at least 180,000 Colombians.
From 1953 to 1964 the violence between the two political parties decreased first when Gustavo Rojas deposed the President of Colombia in a coup d'état and negotiated with the Guerrillas, and then under the military junta of General Gabriel París Gordillo.
After Rojas' deposition the Colombian Conservative Party and Colombian Liberal Party agreed to create the "National Front", a coalition which would jointly govern the country. Under the deal, the presidency would alternate between conservatives and liberals every 4 years for 16 years; the two parties would have parity in all other elective offices. The National Front ended "La Violencia", and National Front administrations attempted to institute far-reaching social and economic reforms in cooperation with the Alliance for Progress. In the end, the contradictions between each successive Liberal and Conservative administration made the results decidedly mixed. Despite the progress in certain sectors, many social and political problems continued, and guerrilla groups were formally created such as the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion – National Liberation Army) and M-19 (May 19th Movement) to fight the government and political system.
Emerging in the late 1970s, powerful and violent drug cartels further developed during the 1980s and 1990s. The Medellín Cartel under Pablo Escobar and the Cali Cartel, in particular, exerted political, economic and social influence in Colombia during this period. These cartels also financed and influenced different illegal armed groups throughout the political spectrum. Some enemies of these allied with the guerrillas and created or influenced paramilitary groups.
The new Colombian Constitution of 1991, ratified after being drafted by the Constituent Assembly of Colombia, included key provisions on political, ethnic, human and gender rights. The new constitution initially prohibited the extradition of Colombian nationals, causing accusations that drug cartels had successfully lobbied for the provision; extradition resumed in 1996 after the provision was repealed. The cartels had previously promoted a violent campaign against extradition, leading to many terrorist attacks and mafia-style executions. They also tried to influence the government and political structure of Colombia through corruption, as in the case of the 8000 Process scandal.
Since the promulgation of the Constitution of 1991 and the reforms made, the country has continued to be plagued by the effects of the drug trade, guerrilla insurgencies like FARC, and paramilitary groups such as the AUC, which along with other minor factions have engaged in a bloody internal armed conflict. President Andrés Pastrana and the FARC attempted to negotiate a solution to the conflict between 1999 and 2002. The government set up a "demilitarized" zone, but repeated tensions and crises led the Pastrana administration to conclude that the negotiations were ineffectual. Pastrana also began to implement the Plan Colombia initiative, with the dual goal of ending the armed conflict and promoting a strong anti-narcotic strategy. During the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, the government applied more military pressure on the FARC and other outlawed groups. After the offensive, supported by aid from the United States, many security indicators improved. Reported kidnappings showed a steep decrease (from 3,700 in 2000 to 172 in 2009 (Jan.-Oct.)) as did intentional homicides (from 28,837 in 2002 to 15,817 in 2009, according to police, while the health system reported a decline from 28,534 to 17,717 during the same period). The rate of abductions declined steadily for almost a decade until 2010, when 280 cases were reported between January and October, most concentrated in the Medellín area. According to official statistics from the Colombian Army FARC-EP had a total of 18,000 members as of December 2010, with 9,000 of them being regular guerrillas and the rest armed militia members operating in civilian clothing in cities and villages. Independent researchers speaking to Time Magazine claimed that the FARC-EP have 30,000 such militia members in 2011, indicating a shift in rebel strategy. ELN are estimated to have between 2900 and 5000 members as of 2010. While rural areas and jungles remained dangerous, the overall reduction of violence led to the growth of internal travel and tourism.
The 2006–2007 Colombian parapolitics scandal emerged from the revelations and judicial implications of past and present links between paramilitary groups, mainly the AUC, and some government officials and many politicians, mostly allied to the governing administration. [2]
2. Drug war and Guerrilla war
During the 1980s, the FARC kidnapped, and in some cases killed, numerous landlords in Colombia's north-central Magdalena Medio region. One of those killed was Carlos Castano's father. After their father's death, Castano and several of his brothers signed on as guides for the Colombian army's Bombona Battalion, XIV Brigade, which armed and trained the first civilian autodefensas, or "self-defense" groups. Funded by large landowners and cattle ranchers, the autodefensas became today's paramilitaries. The Colombian Army openly armed and trained paramilitary groups until 1989, when the government banned them due to their ties with drug traffickers. Ties between the Army and the paramilitaries, however, have not been severed completely.
It was Carlos Castano's brother Fidel who turned the "self-defense" groups into a counterinsurgency force. He also helped build the link between paramilitaries and drug traffickers. In 1985, Fidel Castano met Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellin drug cartel. Escobar in turn introduced Fidel Castano to Jose Rodriguez Gacha, a drug trafficker himself, fierce anti-communist, and leader of the cartel's military operations in Magdalena Medio. Together the two began a campaign of terror against the peasants, the guerrillas, and the government. The Colombian government would eventually accuse them of massacres and political assassinations (including those of two leftist presidential candidates). In April 1990, the authorities found six mass graves on two of Fidel Castano's ranches outside Medellin. They contained a total of 26 bodies, many of them showing signs of torture. Officials said there might be as many as 100 people buried on the paramilitary leader's 250,000 acres.
Sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison for the 1988 massacre of 17 banana-union workers, Fidel Castano remained a wanted man until his 1994 disappearance during an arms-gathering excursion to neighboring Panama. After his brother's disappearance, Carlos Castano officially took over the leadership of the paramilitary forces and its death squads, giving them the name United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). It has been under Carlos Castano's command that the AUC has expanded beyond the cradle of Magdalena Medio and into Colombia's northern provinces. The paramilitaries now dominate the border zones with Panama and Venezuela, where most drug trafficking takes place. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, in 1998 testimony before Congress, linked Castano to "the most significant cocaine traffickers in Colombia today," the Henao-Montoya brothers, and identified him as "a major cocaine trafficker in his own right." In a recent interview with Colombian television, Carlos Castano announced that "drug traffickers and drug trafficking'' finance up to 70% of the AUC's activities. After the demobilization of the AUC the country has seen the rise of at least six new armed paramilitary groups, such as Los Rastrojos and Los Urabeños. These groups are thought to number some 13,000 members as of 2011, and they have been accused of widespread land theft, murder and drug trafficking.
3. Why Colombia matters the United State?
Colombia’s importance to U.S. national interests cannot be overstated. Its 43 million people and location astride two oceans make it geopolitically significant. It is the fifth largest trading partner in Latin America for the United States, with two-way trade exceeding US $11 billion annually. Direct U.S. investment in Colombia exceeds
$4 billion. Colombia is the tenth largest supplier of oil to the United States and could rise in that ranking if petroleum extraction could be conducted in a more secure environment. An estimated 2.5 million Colombians live in the United States, and more come every day,
including some of the country’s most talented people.
From the context of the post-September 11, 2001, heightened security consciousness, Colombia’s internal problems represent a formidable international threat. Colombia provides some 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States and produces 70 percent of the world’s total. Illegal drug use kills some 50,000 persons each year in the United States. The costs of health care, accidents, policing, and lost productivity related
to addiction and crime reached $160 billion in 2000. Illegal drugs are one of the main causes for the swelling prison population in the United States and the serious crime problem among communities. A permanently addicted population is an enormous social and economic burden. The Colombian crisis occurs within the context of a broader Latin
American crisis of authority, governance, and legitimacy. Economies are declining, with unemployment at politically unsustainable levels.
Latin America’s deterioration has five critical implications for the U.S. strategic position:
First, U.S. investments and exports to the region will decline in the face of shrinking markets. Second, Latin America (notably Venezuela and Mexico) once provided a
large amount of U.S. energy imports, but the political polarization in Venezuela between the supporters of President Hugo Chávez (who preaches a combination of anti-American nationalism, populism, and class warfare). Second the political opposition led to the
interruption of the flow of petroleum in the winter of 2002-03 from what was once the United States’ most secure source. Third, the support of Latin American countries is fundamental to the United States over a spectrum of transnational issues that affect the health and security of U.S. society: illegal drugs, terrorism, international crime, contraband, global warming, environmental degradation, and dealing with contagious diseases. Fourth, the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions and citizen insecurity accelerates illegal migration to the United States.
Fifth, the delegitimation of democracy in Latin America could become a strategic defeat for the influence of U.S. principles around the globe, from human rights to democracy to free trade.
A two-party system, Liberals versus Conservatives, has dominated political life since independence, with few legitimate leftist alternatives, including having a weak Communist Party. These are reasons for the emergence of a militarized left, composed of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia — FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional — ELN), and smaller offshoots. They are the oldest guerrilla groups in the world and are self-sustaining by virtue of internal sanctuaries and income from drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping. Unlike the rest of Latin America, Colombia, until recently, always stood out for its consistently solid economic performance. Moreover, the military has been subordinated to civilian authority, though, as will be discussed later, at a significant cost for civil-military relations and national defense. Colombia also experienced the national trauma of La Violencia, an undeclared civil war that began in 1948 and killed an estimated 200,000 people in the next 10 years. This searing experience led to the National Front Agreement of 1957, by which the two parties agreed to alternate the presidency and apportion political power.
An estimated 40 percent of the national territory is not controlled by the government,
both in rural and urban areas. The problem becomes more severe because neighboring states — Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru — do not exercise sovereign control over their own borders with Colombia (though Ecuador does much better than the others). These defects are at the heart of Colombia’s impact on international order and the policy dilemmas they pose for the United States, Latin American countries, and European states.
In mid- 2002, Colombia’s military had only 60,000-80,000 soldiers available for combat against the FARC, ELN, and AUC; to protect the electrical infrastructure, roads and communications, and oil and gas pipelines (5,000 critical points) from sabotage by these insurgent groups; and to patrol 18,000 kilometers of roads and rivers. The rest of the troops were in support roles or in training. Additionally, 6,242 districts needed military presence, but only 980 had it, while the AUC, FARC, and ELN were present in some 5,300 districts. Military resources were concentrated in zones of higher population density and greater economic activity.
Lack of Civilian Ability to Oversee the Military. Another debility is that Colombia civilian authorities lack the experience of working with the military in integrating strategy, intelligence, and operations — a costly deficiency for a society at war for so long. For a long time civilian leaders have held the attitude that the military can be left to
itself to take care of national defense, doing so without the civilians establishing clear expectations, providing the strategic guidance, and holding military commanders accountable.
Minimal Defense Budget. The defense budget, which includes the police (the police are part of the Ministry of Defense), increased from $2.965 billion to $3.256 billion in 2001, still a small 3.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) for a nation at war.
Colombia’s judicial system is weak and dysfunctional, with 95 to 98 percent of crimes committed going unpunished. This amazing statistic is true, despite the fact that Colombia’s allocation is the second highest percentage of a national budget to its judicial system 15 in Latin America: 4.5 percent in the late 1990s. On a per capita basis,
it employs one of the highest numbers of judges of any democracy, 17.1 per 100,000 people. In comparison, the United States employs two and Spain three judges for the same number of citizens.
The state does not exercise control over an estimated 40 percent of the national territory, precisely the areas where illegal drugs are cultivated and where the FARC, ELN, the AUC, and the narcotraffickers are active, in a sense filling the void with de facto
administrative systems in place of the state. This is especially true of the northwestern areas of Urabá and Chocó as well as those of eastern and southeastern Colombia, the lightly populated departments of Arauca, Guaviare, Meta, Guainía, Caquetá, Vaupés, Vichada, and Putumayo, parts of which make up the llanos (plains) of the Amazon
Basin, where permanent habitation is difficult and the presence of the state is minimal.
The tax collection system is complex, repressive, inequitable, and suffers from extensive evasion. The following statistics are eloquent. The government collects half of its budget in taxes and finances the rest. Eight tax reforms in the 1990s increased collections by a mere 3 percent. In a country of 43 million, 4,500 large tax contributors account for 90 percent of the income tax. Only 10 percent of the population pays taxes of any kind. In some regions, such as La 19 Guajira, contraband accounts for 60 percent of the economy. Upon taking office, President Uribe declared a state of emergency in the nation and imposed a new tax on wealthier citizens and businesses. The new tax of 1.2 percent affected those with $65,000 of liquid assets. An estimated 400,000 people would qualify for the tax, raising approximately $800 million for the defense budget.
The Colombian conflict is generated by a complex mix of historical contention over land ownership, common criminality, narcotics related crime, and insurgency (FARC and ELN) that once had an ideological foundation but now has been corrupted by money
from narcotics, kidnapping, and extortion, as well as the AUC paramilitary response.
Operation ORION: Retaking Comuna Trece in Medellín. Medellín’s Comuna Trece slum neighborhoods are home to 129,000 people. For 10 years, until October 2002, it was a stronghold of the FARC and ELN, which terrorized, extorted, kidnapped, and murdered with impunity. Evidence of the lack of government control was the fact that the AUC itself had penetrated about 70 percent of the other slum areas of the city, doing so with the support of some 400 armed gangs numbering 10,000. On October 16, 2002, Uribe ordered 3,000 troops backed by helicopters to retake the area. Instead of pulling
out quickly, the military stayed for days, establishing a sense of permanent security, followed by the reinsertion of the police and the construction of two military posts. Operation ORION resulted in 18 dead, 34 wounded, 250 arrests, and the freeing of 20 kidnap victims.
Understanding the nature of the conflict is key to understanding the evolving response of the United States. The strategic imperative and the kind of assistance changed radically with the inception of the “drug war” in 1989 and the mandate given to the U.S. military to take on a counternarcotics mission, followed soon by the intensification of the security problem in Colombia. By 1997-98, the United States had spent nearly a decade of effort
in Peru and Bolivia to reduce coca production and shipment. The strategic breakthrough came in the mid-1990s through the combined application of interdiction, eradication (voluntary and forced by means of aerial spraying of glyphosate, commercially known as
Roundup), and the implementation of alternative crop production (called alternative development) for peasants who lost out by no longer being able to produce coca.
The main elements of the original U.S. aid package are critical to understand because Plan Colombia has not been an easy sell, due to misinformation and plain lack of information. Moreover, the allocations demonstrate that this was not merely a narrow military assistance program, contrary to criticism both in the United States and abroad:
1. Support for human rights and judicial reform — $122 million.
2. Expansion of counternarcotics operations in Southern Colombia — $390.5 million (for helicopters, humanitarian assistance, and development assistance).
3. Alternative economic development — $81 million for Colombia, $85 million for Bolivia, and $8 million for Ecuador.
4. Increased interdiction efforts — $129.4 million.
5. Assistance for the Colombian police — $115.6 million
4. The Colombian Cartels
In order to launder the incoming money of the trafficking operations, the Cali cartel heavily invested its funds into legitimate business ventures as well as front companies to mask the money through. In 1996 it was believed the Cartel was grossing $7 billion in annual revenue from the US alone.
With the influx of cash comes the need to launder the funds. One of the first instances of the Cali Cartel laundering operations came when Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela was able to secure the position of Chairman of the Board, of Banco de Trabajadores. The bank was believed to be used to launder funds for the Cali cartel, as well as Pablo Escobars' Medellín Cartel. Cartel members were permitted, through their affiliation with Gilberto, to overdraft accounts and take out loans without repayment.
Capitalizing off of this basis, Gilberto was able to found the First InterAmericas Bank operating out of Panama. In an interview with Time magazine, Gilberto admitted to money being laundered through the bank, however attributed the process to only legal actions. The laundering, which Gilberto states was "in accordance with Panamanian law", is what led to the US authorities pursuing him. Gilberto later started the Grupo Radial Colombiano, a network of over 30 radio stations and a pharmaceutical chain named Drogas la Rebaja, which at its height amassed over 400 stores in 28 cities, employing 4200. The pharmaceutical chains value was estimated at $216 million. The leader was eventually tracked down. Gilberto Orejuela was arrested in the mid-1990s and are currently serving 10 to 15 year prison terms. Many experts believe they actually worked out an arrangement with the Colombian government under similar terms to the Ochoas, that they would not be extradited to a US prison cell. DEA agents believe they are still running their empire from their prison cells
The astounding profits attracted an interesting mix of characters into the business. Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha had roots in Colombia's somewhat murky emerald trade. The Ochoa brothers were from a well respected ranching and horsing family. And the violent leader, Pablo Escobar, was a common street thief who masterminded the criminal enterprise that became known as the Medellin cartel. The men from Medellin joined together with a young marijuana smuggler named Carlos Lehder, who convinced the leaders that they could fly cocaine in small airplanes directly into the United States, avoiding the need for countless suitcase trips. During the 1980's, the cartel revolted against the government's threats to extradite the traffickers to the United States. Pablo Escobar is thought to be responsible for the murder of hundreds of government officials, police, prosecutors, judges, journalists and innocent bystanders.
The cartel began to self-destruct as the violence and power grew. Rodriguez Gacha was eventually gunned down by the Colombian police. Jorge, Juan David and Fabio Ochoa turned themselves into the Colombian government in the early 1990s in exchange for lenient prison terms. And Pablo Escobar was hunted down and killed by the Colombian police after a long series of battles.
5. Drug trafficking and transportation [11]
Drug trafficking is the most widespread and lucrative organized crime operation in the United States, accounting for nearly 40 percent of this country's organized crime activity and generating an annual income estimated to be as high as $110 billion. America's cocaine supply at present originates exclusively in South America. Coca is cultivated principally in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, and conversion laboratories have been located in Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela. The Colombian involvement in U.S. cocaine trafficking can be traced to the influx of Cuban citizens to South Florida after the Castro Revolution in the early 1960's. Some of the Cuban-settled communities became bases for the continuation of established Cuban organized crime networks known as the "Cuban Mafia." The Cuban Mafia had been a major distributor of the cocaine in Cuba, where the drug has long been accepted as a social luxury, and thus had existing connections with South American cocaine trafficking organizations. At first, the Florida Cuban Mafia factions imported only enough cocaine to satisfy members of their own community, but by the mid-1960's, they began to import greater quantities of the drug in an effort to expand distribution and increase profit. By 1965 Colombians supplied nearly 100 percent of the cocaine moving through the Cuban networks. Colombians refined the drug and Cubans trafficked and distributed it in the United States. By 1978 Colombian traffickers had cut all ties with the Cubans and assumed the dominant role they now play in supplying cocaine to the American market. The major Colombian trafficking organizations are structured to control each intermediate step required in processing and exporting cocaine. Cocaine is ordinarily smuggled from South America to the United States for major trafficking organizations by American citizens acting as mercenary pilots. Recruits include ex-military, commercial and private pilots, and in some cases, unlicensed aviators. The speed, mobility and evasive capabilities of air transport have made it the preferred node of shipment among Colombian traffickers, and many have built airstrips either near their processing centers or along the coastlines to permit the fast direct export of cocaine. On Colombia's north coast alone, over 150 clandestine landing strips. To maximize range and capability, smuggling planes are often outfitted with auxiliary fuel systems. These auxiliary systems may be attached to the outside body of the aircraft or the wing, but must be inspected and approved by the Federal Aviation Administration each time the outfitted aircraft prepares for flight. A favored auxiliary system for cocaine traffickers is the collapsible rubber fuel "bladder," which may be placed in the plane's fuselage, and simply folded up or thrown away after the fuel contained within is used.
Devoe Airlines was a scheduled commuter air service operating between Miami and smaller Florida cities during the early 1980's. Owned by Miami pilot Jack Devoe, the business was essentially a front for a Colombian drug trafficking operation, which included regular large quantity marijuana and cocaine smuggling. In total, 8 to 10 contract pilots employed by Devoe were involved in over 100 trafficking flights over a five year period and carried roughly 7,000 pounds of cocaine from South America to the United States. Devoe's trafficking pilots initially travelled non-stop routes between the United States and Colombia, but developed a transshipment point on Little Derby Island in the Bahamas for purposes of "security . . . [and] police protection" in the 1980's. Generally, Devoe pilots returned to the United States within one day. The Devoe organization's methods for avoiding interdiction between South America and the United States were relatively simple and typical of such smuggling operations. A Devoe pilot learned the frequencies of DEA surveillance aircraft on one occasion by "acting like a helicopter buff" inspecting a DEA Cobra pursuit helicopter parked near the Devoe hangar.
Adler Berriman Seal, a former TWA 747 captain, flew cocaine from Colombia to the United States for over seven years during the late 1970's and early 1980's. Seal was recruited as a trafficking pilot by a personal friend who worked for the Colombian cocaine trafficking organization headed by Jorge Ochoa, and eventually worked directly with that organization's leadership.
Initially, Seal flew direct trafficking flights between Louisiana, and Colombia. He piloted a number of different smuggling aircraft, the largest of which was a Vietnam-vintage C-123 capable of holding tons of packaged cocaine. Seal always departed and returned to his Louisiana base at night to reduce chances of interdiction. According to Seal, the Ochoa organization paid Colombian officials bribes of $10,000 to $25,000, per flight for a "window. Seal used two fairly simple techniques to avoid interdiction on his return trip to the United States: both were effective because of the heavy helicopter traffic running between the Gulf Coast States and the hundreds of oil rigs located off shore. First, when he reached the middle of the Gulf on his return trip, Seal slowed his aircraft to 110-120 knots and was thus perceived by monitoring radar as a helicopter, not a plane. Secondly, at a distance of about 50 miles off the United States coast, he dropped the aircraft to an altitude of 500-1000 feet in order to co-mingle with the helicopter traffic, and thereby arouse even less suspicion. Once in United States airspace, Seal proceeded to prearranged points 40 to 50 miles inland. The points were mapped out in advance with Loran C, a long-range navigational instrument. Further inland, he was generally joined by a helicopter. The two aircraft proceeded to a drop zone, where the helicopter hovered close to the ground. Seal then dropped the load of cocaine from the airplane on a parachute; the helicopter picked up the load from the drop zone and delivered it to waiting automobiles, which eventually moved the cocaine to Miami. Seal proceeded to land his drug-free aircraft at any nearby airport.[15]
At some point after the arrests of these confidential sources [the informants] in Colombia, the DEA Office in Bogotá claimed that it was unaware that the Confidential Sources would be traveling from Colombia to the United States with a sample of the acrylic substance containing cocaine. The acrylic containing the narcotics could be molded into any form and any color. The Colombian narco-trafficking organization was said to be producing acrylic containing narcotics in the form of key chains, lamps, picture frames and shower doors. The large quantities and the growing appetite for cocaine in the United States led to huge profits, which the cartel began re-investing into more sophisticated labs, better airplanes and even an island in the Caribbean where the planes could refuel. Traffickers today have enough capital under their control to build sophisticated smuggling equipment, such as a high tech submarine that was recently discovered by the Colombian National Police. Colombian cocaine traffickers had hired engineering experts from Russia and the United States to help with the design of the submarine, which apparently would have been used to secretly ship large quantities of cocaine to the United States.
Ecuadorian authorities, with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assistance, recently seized a small submarine built for the purpose of transporting narcotics. A DEA official stated that the submarine likely cost $4 million to build and was capable of hauling 6 to 10 metric tons of cocaine per trip. The submarine was likely built to bypass Central America and deliver cocaine directly to Mexico or even the United States. Measuring nearly 100 feet long and 10 feet high, while containing air conditioning, the submarine represents one of the most impressive means of moving narcotics discovered to date.
6. Impact of Colombian Drug [13]
Since the 1970's, Colombia has been home to some of the most violent and sophisticated drug trafficking organizations in the world. What started as a small cocaine smuggling business has, in the last thirty years, blossomed into an enormous multi-national cocaine empire. Traffickers started out with much more modest goals. In the mid-1970s, marijuana traffickers in Colombia began exporting small quantities of cocaine to the United States hidden in suitcases. At that point, cocaine could be processed for $1500/kilo in jungle labs and could be sold on the streets of America for as much as $50,000/kilo.
However, imagine for a moment that it hadn’t had to be that way. Imagine a peaceful Colombia, free of cocaine, free of Pablo Escobars, Carlos Castaños and Manuel Marulandas (the beauty of that thought is so painful that it makes me want to stop fantasizing). Imagine, for example, that due to some mystery of fate, Colombia’s soil had proven totally incapable of growing marijuana and coca plants. Or, even better, imagine that the easy-money culture that comes with drug trafficking had never taken hold of the Colombian people. Just for one second, imagine.
For decades now, Colombia has been a main battleground of the international war on drugs. The world’s top cocaine producer, Colombia has fought bravely and tirelessly to reduce drug production. There is no other country that has seen more of its citizens die in the battle against cocaine: since 1990 there have been 450,000 homicides in Colombia; in Mexico, another front of the war on drugs but with more than double the number of inhabitants, homicides in that same period amount to 220,000. For sure, cocaine has made Colombia bleed. But the costs of the drug war go well beyond the number of casualties. The tragedy of the many Colombians who have been internally displaced since the 1980s has no parallel in the Western Hemisphere. Between 2.5 and 4 million people (there is debate over the exact number) have left their hometowns in the search for safety. In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of forest acres have been cut down to grow coca and build camps for the production of cocaine. For every cultivated hectare (2.5 acres) of coca, around three hectares of forest are destroyed – and last year alone the UN found 81,000 hectares of coca inside the country. It will take time for Colombians to realize the depth of the environmental impact that drug production has had on their country.
So the country survived and improved to a large degree, but that transformation came at a high price. In the past five years, annual defense spending has been equivalent to 5.3% of the economy (between US$11 and 12 billion). In contrast, the average South American country spends the equivalent of 1.7% of GDP on its defense budget. Looking in the books, you will find that between 1988 and 1995 Colombia never spent more than 2.5% of GDP on defense, and the figure in the late 1990s rose to a maximum of 3.3% of the economy. It is not hard to conclude that if Colombia were the average South American country with no drug war to fight, the government would not need to spend such a large amount of public funds on defense. That means that if Colombia had around 20 (and not its current 36) homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, almost no coca plants to eradicate, no insurgencies, and no cocaine to export, the government could make budget savings amounting to 3.6% of GDP, or about US$9 billion! I bet the government could erase the fiscal deficit with that. From year 2000 the Colombian military claims that Plan Patriota has reduced FARC ranks from 18,000 to 12,000 in the past year. Information provided by the Office of the Colombian President reports that the campaign was able to take back control of 11 FARC-run villages, destroy more than 400 FARC camps, capture 1,534 explosive devices and 323 gas-cylinder bombs, kill 2,518 combatants, and capture large
amounts of ammunition and weapons. Most observers agree that public safety conditions in Colombia have improved. Police have been redeployed to areas from which they had
been previously ousted by armed groups, and now have a presence in every municipality. A greater security presence has significantly given Colombians more confidence to travel by road. The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee held hearings on the topic on November 18, 2004. Rates of cocaine abuse have increased in Europe, yet critics argue that Europe has not provided sufficient levels of assistance. The Colombian Agency for International Cooperation reported that the European Union and its member states spent about $120 million in Colombia in 2003. At a February 3-4, 2005 international donors conference held in Cartegena, Colombia, attended by the United States, Europe, Japan, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the Colombian government presented its demobilization plan and the need for international support. It is estimated that the AUC demobilization will cost about $160 million. Donors expressed support for the demobilization process, but insisted that Colombia adopt a legal framework that ensures demobilized fighters are prosecuted for crimes, citing the need for “truth, justice, and reparations,” before aid would be committed.
As long as Colombia remains at the center of the war against drugs, the country will keep paying a high price for its security. While a peace accord is not impossible, one will not come easily. Colombians from many different walks of life are, under delicate circumstances, working toward this end. The country needs bolstered efforts to replace coca with other crops, economic aid and development, and above all peace. The United States' devotion to its time-honored counterinsurgency strategy, however, is not helping matters-and threatens to destabilize a region already burdened by economic and civil strife.
For now the drug goes on, its cost keep growing and other societies is getting worst….
Excerps from different documents by Nguyen Hong Phuc
References:
1. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2001/04/Helping-Colombia-Fix-Its-Plan -Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency. By Stephen Johnson April 26, 2001
2. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/South_America/Paramilitaries_Colombia.html. THE "DRUG WAR" AND THE GUERRILLA WAR. Paramilitaries, Drug Trafficking
and U.S. Policy in Colombia by Samia Montalvo
3. Inside Colombia – History of Rev Armed Force in Colombia (RAFC) - http://books.google.com/books?id=cOU0bvG8ZGwC&pg=PA180&dq=farc+colombia+founded&cd=12&hl=en#v=onepage&q=farc%20colombia%20founded&f=false
- Inside Colombia – Book – Drug, Democracy and War by Grace Livingstone
5. http://narconews.com/Issue53/article3099.html - Money Laundering & Murder in Colombia: Official Documents Point to DEA Complicity Kent Memo’s Corruption Allegations Bolstered by FOIA Records, Leaked U.S. Embassy Teletype.
6. http://www.cjpf.org/drug/prospectsforpeace.pdf - plan Colombia
7. http://csis.org/blog/ecuador-seizes-drug-trafficking-submarine
8. http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031302.html
9. http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr113005a.html
10. Cali Cartel money Laundering by Wikipedia
11. The United State and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity
12. http://colombiareports.com/opinion/131-gustavo-silva-cano/7824-the-price-of-colombias-drug-war.html.
13. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.
- Congressional Research Service – Plan Colombia : A Progress Report by Connie Veillette June 22 , 2005
